Christian Seel (Maastricht University)
Abstract: This paper considers Hotelling competition between asymmetric players, such as political candidates with a valence component in an electoral campaign or price-differentiated firms that choose their positions in the product space. We provide a full characterization of the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. In equilibrium, the advantaged player randomizes at positions close to the center, while the disadvantaged player randomizes across more extreme positions. The equilibrium has technically novel features such as multiple mass points and gaps in the support. Our results address open problems in political economy, industrial organization, and contest theory. As an illustrating example, we derive a subgame-perfect equilibrium of a game where two firms compete by first choosing prices and then locations.
You can find Christian’s website here: Christian Seel.
He will be available for individual meetings on the day of the seminar. Giulia and Yihan will coordinate the schedule. Please use the following Google sheet if you want to reserve a slot: Research Seminar SoSe 26