Angel Luis Lopez (Institute for Economic Analysis)

will give a talk on               

Common Ownership and Technology Adoption

in the DICE research seminar.

Abstract: We analyse how common ownership shapes technology adoption in duopolistic innovation timing games with no information lags. Absent common ownership, there is first-mover advantage that triggers a preemptive race where both firms aim to be the leader, as in Fudenberg and Tirole (1985). The outcome is early adoption (at high cost) and rent equalization. We show however that common ownership may slow down technology adoption. There is a threshold of common ownership, which indeed can be low, above which there is second-mover advantage: the preemptive race transforms into a waiting game that results in slow technology diffusion and no rent equalization.

You can find Angel’s website here: http://www.angelluislopez.net/

He will be available for individual meetings on the day of the seminar. Henning and Simon will coordinate the schedule. Please write them an email () if you want to reserve a slot.